A CONTRIBUTION TO THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES

CHRISTIAN FUCHS

Abstract

The overall aim of this work is to contribute to the discussion of theoretical aspects of critical media and communication theory. A typology of critical media and communication studies is constructed. Example approaches that are based on the commodity hypothesis, the ideology hypothesis, the alternative media hypothesis, and the alternative reception hypothesis are discussed. It is argued that integrative bridging approaches can be found and that a disciplinary matrix can enhance the dialogue about commonalities and differences within critical communication studies.

Christian Fuchs is Associate Professor at the University of Salzburg; e-mail: christian.fuchs@sbg.ac.at.
Introduction

For conducting critical media and communication studies, one first of all needs to know what these studies are about and which categories they can make use of. This work reflects on the theoretical foundations of critical media and communication studies. The research questions are: How can critical media and communication studies be defined? Which different types of critical media and communication studies are there?

Robert T. Craig (1999) sees critical communication studies as one of seven traditions of communication theory that he distinguishes based on their notions of communication. For Craig, the characteristic that distinguishes critical communication studies from rhetorical, semiotic, phenomenological, cybernetic, sociopsychological, and sociocultural traditions of communication theory is that for “critical communication theory, the basic ‘problem of communication’ in society arises from material and ideological forces that preclude and distort discursive reflection. ... Fundamentally, in the tradition of Marx, its point is not to understand the world ... Its point is to change the world through praxis, or theoretically reflective social action” (Craig 1999, 147f). Craig works out the specifics of critical studies and other traditions in communication studies. However, I would add to Craig’s account of critical communication studies that it is not only about the analysis of those conditions that distort communication, i.e. the ways how communication is embedded into relations of domination, but also about finding alternative conditions of society and communication that are non-dominative and about struggles for establishing such alternatives. Craig argues that “communication theory has not yet emerged as a coherent field study” and that this fragmentation can be overcome by constructing “a dialogical-dialectical disciplinary matrix” (Craig 1999, 120) that enables the emergence of a conversational community, “a common awareness of certain complementarities and tensions among different types of communication theory, so it is commonly understood that these different types of theory cannot legitimately develop in total isolation from each other but must engage each other in argument” (Craig 1999, 124). The same can be said about critical communication studies as a subfield of communication studies. A disciplinary matrix of critical communication studies can enhance the dialogue between various subfields of the subfield –such as critical theory, critical political economy, cultural studies, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, queer theory, and new social movements – so that common assumptions and differences about what it means to conduct critical studies of communication can emerge. This paper is an attempt to contribute to foundations of creating such a matrix.

The basic idea that this paper wants to advance is that a unity of plurality of critical media and communication studies can best be achieved by remembering the Marxian roots of this field. A model that focuses on the Marxian division into production, circulation, and consumption as three differentiated and connected dialectical aspects of the economy allows connecting the various approaches.

The method employed in this work is philosophy of communication and theory construction. First, a broad definition of critical media and communication studies is elaborated. Second, a typology is suggested that is based on the notions of production, circulation, and consumption of media that are mapped with the political notions of emancipation and repression.
A Definition of Critical Media and Communication Studies

What many definitions of critical communication and media studies share is a focus on the analysis of media, communication, and culture in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, oppression, and control as object of study (see for example Gandy 1982, Hardt 1992, Kellner 1995, Knoche 2005, Winter 2004). Such analyses are undertaken with all intellectual means that are necessary in order to contribute to the establishment of a participatory, co-operative society. From a praxeo-onto-epistemological perspective on science (see Hofkirchner, Fuchs & Klauninger 2005, 78-81), we can then define critical communication and media studies as studies that focus ontologically on the analysis of media, communication, and culture in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, oppression, and control by employing at the epistemological level all theoretical and/or empirical means that are necessary for doing so in order to contribute at the praxeological level to the establishment of a participatory, co-operative society. Given such a definition, critical communication and media studies are inherently normative and political.

Certainly all media, communications, and cultural scholars claim to be critical. It seems to me that critique is one of the most inflationary terms used in the humanities and social sciences (Fuchs and Sandoval 2008). This issue was already at the heart of the positivism debate in German sociology in 1961. For Karl R. Popper (1962), the method of the social sciences was gaining and differentiating knowledge by testing solutions to problems. This method would be critical because scholars would question the works of others in order to improve knowledge in trial and error processes. For Popper, critique was an epistemological method that shows logical contradictions. Theodor W. Adorno (1962) argued that contradictions are not only epistemological (in the relation of subject-object), but can be inherent in objects themselves so that they cannot be resolved by acquiring new knowledge (Adorno 1962, 551). Adorno stressed that Popper’s ideal of value-free science was shaped by the bourgeois concept of value as exchange value (Adorno 1962, 560) and that positivism is only oriented on Appearance, whereas Critical Theory focuses on the difference between Essence and Appearance (Adorno 1969, 291). He pointed out that Popper’s notion of critique was subjective and cognitive (1969, 304).

The underlying difference of this dispute is between epistemological critique (Popper) and the critique of society (Adorno). I argue that it is the second understanding that should be used for defining critical media and communication studies and that therefore there is also a whole lot of uncritical thinking in media and communication studies. Based on Horkheimer (1937/2002), a distinction between traditional and critical media and communication studies can be drawn.

Critical media and communication studies as critique of domination in the context of media, culture, and communication correspond perfectly to the understanding of critique given by Marx in the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in 1844: “The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest essence for man – hence, with the categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence, relations which cannot be better described than by the cry of a Frenchman when it was planned to introduce a tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you as human beings!” (MEW 1, 385). If we understand Marxian critique as the critique
of all forms of domination and all domative relationships, then all critical studies and therefore also all critical media and communication studies are at least Marxian-inspired. My argument is that this heritage should not be denied, but taken seriously and positively acknowledged.

Critical media and communication studies should be in line with the most recent developments of social theory in order to show that they can be connected to current debates. One of the major debates in the social sciences in the past years has been the one on public social sciences. Critical studies have been discussed as part of this debate. Therefore this discourse seems to be particularly suited as a point of reference for critical media and communication studies.

Michael Burawoy (2005a; 2005b; 2007) argues that neoliberalism has resulted in the privatisation of everything. Conducting public social science that tackles real world problems would become ever more important because society would have become more precarious and reactionary. In the 1970s, the social sciences would have lagged behind the radical character of social movements and therefore the task would have been to create a critical academic social science. Today, society would be more reactionary, and society would lag behind academia. Therefore the primary task for the social sciences would be to transform society. In traditional public social sciences, scholars would write in the opinion pages of national newspapers. In organic public social sciences, scholars would work “in close connection with a visible, thick, active, local, and often counterpublic” (Burawoy 2007, 28). “Critical sociology is a normative dialogue, primarily among sociologists and conventionally directed to professional sociology, whereas public sociology is dialogue primarily between sociologists and publics about the normative foundations of society” (Burawoy 2005a, 380).

This distinction is based on two questions: Social science for what (instrumental knowledge or reflexive knowledge)? Social science for whom (academic audience or extra-academic audience)? Burawoy bases the first distinction on Horkheimer and Adorno (Burawoy 2007, 34). Instrumental knowledge would be oriented on means to reach ends, whereas reflexive knowledge would be concerned with the ends of society. This means that reflexive knowledge is inherently ethical, political, and partisan.

“Public sociology has no intrinsic normative valences, other than the commitment to dialogue around issues raised in and by sociology. It can as well support Christian fundamentalism as it can liberation sociology or communitarianism” (Burawoy 2007, 30).

For Max Horkheimer, the distinction was not between instrumental reason and reflexive reason, but between instrumental reason and critical reason. Instrumental reason is oriented on utility, profitableness, and productivity. Critical reason is partisan and operates with the Marxian categories of class, exploitation, surplus value, profit, misery, and breakdown. These categories constitute a whole that is not oriented on “the preservation of contemporary society”, but on the “transformation into the right kind of society” (Horkheimer 1937/2002, 218). The goal of critical theory would be the transformation of society as a whole (219) so that a “society without injustice” (221) emerges that is shaped by “reasonableness, and striving for peace, freedom, and happiness” (222), “in which man’s actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his own decision” (229), and that is “a state of affairs
in which there will be no exploitation or oppression” (241). Horkheimer (1937/2002) argued that critical theory wants to enhance the realization of all human potentialities (248). It “never simply aims at an increase of knowledge as such. Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery” (249) and “the happiness of all individuals” (248).

Social sciences that support Christian fundamentalism are therefore for Horkheimer (1937/2002) a false form of partisanship and a form of public science that supports a dominative and instrumental society. Such studies are based on instrumental reason and should therefore better be considered as being part of instrumental policy social science and not of reflexive public social science. What is needed is not just public social sciences, but critical, Marxian-inspired, left wing, progressive public social sciences in Horkheimer’s (1937/2002) sense. I therefore agree with Francis Fox Piven (2007), who argues for a “dissident and critical public sociology.”

Based on these assumptions, I want to further develop Burawoy’s typology into a Horkheimerian direction. The advantage of this twist is that it avoids relativism and has a clear notion of what is critical. Based on Burawoy’s schema, once critical media and communication studies become a dominant paradigm, they are no longer critical, but instrumental and those positivistic approaches that are dominant today for Burawoy then become critical approaches because they challenge the dominant paradigm. Critical media and communication studies could then no longer be termed critical. The disadvantage of Burawoy’s approach is that it does not have a clear notion of what is critical. The notion of critique that I employ is not just a critique of dominant academic traditions, but critique of dominative society and class structuration as such. The public social science envisioned here is a strong form of Burawoy’s public social science, a strong objectivity that is termed public critical social sciences and that is opposed by the now-dominant public uncritical social sciences. In the purely academic world, critical social sciences challenge the dominant uncritical, positivistic professional instrumental social sciences. What Burawoy defines as sociological socialism should be stressed more explicitly as the desirable form of the public social sciences, whereas instrumental public social sciences that advance dominative interests should be seen as undesirable. “We might say that critical engagement with real utopias is today an integral part of the project of sociological socialism. It is a vision of a socialism that places society, or social humanity at its organizing center. … If public sociology is to have a progressive impact it will have to hold itself continuously accountable to some such vision of democratic socialism” (Burawoy 2005b, 325). Burawoy’s

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<th>Academic Audience</th>
<th>Extra-Academic Audience</th>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Social Sciences: Research conducted within research programs that define assumptions, theories, concepts, questions, and puzzles.</td>
<td>Policy Social Sciences: Public defence of social research, human subjects; funding, congressional briefings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Social Sciences: Critical debates of the discipline within and between research programs.</td>
<td>Public Social sciences: Concern for the public image of the social sciences; presenting findings in an accessible manner; teaching basics of social science; and writing textbooks.</td>
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Table 1: Michael Burawoy’s Typology of Social Science Approaches
distinction between traditional and organic public social science does not account for Horkheimer’s (1937/2002) insight that the first type is based on instrumental reason and is undesirable.

Table 2: A Typology of Instrumental and Critical Social Sciences

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Extra-Academic Audience</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>Public Uncritical Social Sciences: Social sciences that speak with the public in the interest of dominative interests such as capital interests or conservative political interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>Public Critical Social Sciences: Social sciences that address and speak with the public in the interest of the abolishment of domination and the establishment of participatory democracy.</td>
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This typology can also be applied to media and communication studies.

Table 3: A Typology of Instrumental and Critical Communication Studies

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>Public Uncritical Media and Communication Studies: They speak with the public on communication-related issues in the interest of dominative interests such as capital interests or conservative political interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>Public Critical Media and Communication Studies: Address and speak with the public on issues that relate to media, communication, and culture in the context of domination and in the interest of the abolishment of domination and the establishment of participatory democracy.</td>
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Burawoy argues that due to power constellations and powerful interests instrumental social sciences dominate over reflexive social sciences. The social sciences would be fields of power. But this field of power should not be the ultimately accepted state of the social sciences. One should struggle for the end of the division of labour so that all social sciences become critical and therefore non-instrumental. The goal then is a unified critical social science. Dialectical negation is not just the struggle for the acknowledgement of the other, but also the struggle for negation of negation and sublation so that a new whole that is a differentiated unity of plurality can emerge. Burawoy dismisses such arguments, saying that the social sciences “since their very definition … partake in both instrumental and reflexive knowledge” (Burawoy 2007, 53). Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002) have pointed out that instrumental reason is characteristic for class societies because mecha-
nisms for legitimising and knowledge for enforcing alienation and exploitation are needed. If this is the case, then instrumental sociology has a historical character and should come to an end once instrumental society comes to an end. Burawoy essentialises the division of labour of the contemporary social sciences. Critical thinkers in many cases are discriminated by dominant institutions and therefore have to worry about attaining degrees, tenure, and professorships. Given the domination of instrumental reason in the academic system, it is not so easy to establish the structural foundations that enable engaging critically in the public. Therefore the liberal democratic pluralism of the academic system that Burawoy envisions is worth struggling for in the first instance. But one should not stop there, but also struggle for the establishment of an academic system that is no longer instrumental at all. The struggle for a non-instrumental academic system is at the same time the struggle for a non-instrumental society and vice versa. The ultimate goal should not be a division of academic labour with equal subfields based on liberal pluralism, but unified critical academic and public media and communication studies within a unified critical academic and public social science.

If reflexive or critical social sciences are just understood as a critique of dominant social sciences that provides alternative outlooks, then this means that if progressive social sciences are dominant, one should support conservative and reactionary approaches for the sake of pluralism. My argument counter to that is that politically conservative approaches and instrumental social sciences should not be supported, and that the goal is not liberal pluralism, but the overall critical character of the social sciences, i.e. social sciences oriented on societal problems and the advancement of participatory democracy.

Based on a general broad notion of critical media and communication studies, a typology of various approaches within this field can be provided. The decisive moment for constructing such a typology is an application of Marxian theory. Marxian theory allows showing common aspects of various critical media and communication studies.

A Typology of Critical Media and Communication Studies

For constructing a typology of critical media studies, the Marxian distinction between three dialectically mediated spheres of the economy can be utilised: production, circulation, and consumption. “In the process of production members of society appropriate (produce, fashion) natural products in accordance with human requirements” (MEW 13, 620). In capitalism, the role of goods is determined by their exchange value that dominates over their use value and constitutes their commodity form. Marx describes circulation as “an intermediate phase between production [...] and consumption” (MEW 13, 630). In the circulation sphere, money is exchanged with commodities, entrepreneurs realise profit by selling commodities, consumers exchange money for goods. The commodity then leaves circulation and enters the sphere of consumption, “where it serves either as means of subsistence or means of production” (MEW 23, 129). The starting point of analysis for Marx is production, which is “the decisive factor” (MEW 13, 625): “The process always starts afresh with production” (MEW 13, 625, 630f). The three moments are interconnected. Consumption creates new needs, which are produced in commodity form (MEW 13, 623). Consumption creates production. Production “supplies the material, the
object of consumption ... therefore, production creates, produces consumption” (MEW 13, 623). Production is a consumption of means of production, consumption is a (re)production of the human body and mind. Production is based on circulation of means of production and labour forces that are consumed by capital. Therefore production is circulation. Circulation produces a distribution of money and commodity capital in a certain distribution between classes.

In the realm of the media we find:
1. The organisation of the journalistic production of content that is generated and stored with the help of media tools.
2. The distribution of content with the help of transmission technologies, so that
3. Recipients consume cultural content.

Production is a consumption of journalistic labour power and fixed media capital, distribution is a production of the class-stratified allocation of wealth and information, consumption is reproduction of labour power and the production of meaning and needs.

Those who follow the emancipation hypothesis assume that the media function primarily as means of criticising domination and as tools of class struggle. Those who advance the repression hypothesis argue that the media are primarily means for enforcing and deepening domination and class rule.

Table 4: A Typology of Critical Media Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Sphere</th>
<th>Circulation Sphere</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repression Hypothesis</td>
<td>Commodity Hypothesis: Media as commodities for accumulating capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression Hypothesis</td>
<td>Manipulation- and Ideology Hypothesis: Media as means of manipulation for the ideological enforcement of class interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emancipation Hypothesis</td>
<td>Alternative Media Hypothesis: Media as spheres of grassroots production and circulation of alternative content</td>
<td>Reception Hypothesis: Media reception as contradictory process involving oppositional practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>Integrative critical media theories</td>
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Representatives of the commodity hypothesis argue that the media are not primarily ideological means of manipulation, but spheres of capital accumulation. Examples are Dallas Smythe’s (1978/1997) notion of the audience commodity, Nicholas Garnham’s (1990, 2005) stress on the economic role of media as creators of surplus value through commodity production, exchange, and advertising, or Wolfgang Fritz Haug’s (1971, 1975) notion of commodity aesthetics.

The basic contention underlying the manipulation and ideology hypothesis is that the media are used as tools that manipulate people, advance ideologies, forestall societal transformations, create false consciousness, false needs, and a one-dimensional universe of thought, language, and action. Examples are Max Horkheimer’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s (1944/2002) theory of the culture indus-


Representatives of the reception hypothesis argue that reception is a complex and antagonistic process that provides potentials for oppositional interpretations and actions. The most prominent representatives of this hypothesis can be found in cultural studies. Many works in cultural studies focus on cultural practices of everyday life and the interpretation of texts within this sphere (Bennett 1992, 23; Johnson 1986/1987, 43; Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg 1992, 11). John Fiske (1989a, b; 1996) in a deterministic mode of causal argumentation sees resistance as an automatic feature of popular culture: “The reading relations of popular culture are not those of liberal pluralism, for they are always relationships of domination and subordination, always one of top-down power and of bottom-up power resisting or evading it. (…) Popular culture in elaborated societies is the culture of the subordinate who resent their subordination, who refuse to consent to their positions or to contribute to a consensus that maintains it” (Fiske 1989b, 168f). “Discursive struggles are an inevitable part of life in societies whose power and resources are inequitably distributed. … A media event, then, as a point of maximum discursive visibility, is also a point of maximum turbulence” (Fiske 1996, 5, 8).

The pure repression hypothesis poses the threat that potentials for change are excluded and that humans are tempted to hold a defeatist attitude. Robert McChesney, who argues in favour of a media reform movement, stresses this argument (McChesney 2007, McChesney and Nicholis 2004). The pure commodity hypothesis ignores ideological aspects of the media, which are stressed by representatives of the manipulation hypothesis. The pure manipulation hypothesis leaves out aspects of capital accumulation with the help of the media.

The pure emancipation hypothesis is too optimistic and overlooks that alternative media and alternative reception frequently remain ineffective, unimportant, marginalised, and without influence. Structural inequality in the access and use of media caused by the class and ownership structure of capitalism are not enough taken into account. Theories of alternative media hardly discuss possibilities of
alternative usage or reception of existing mass media. Reception theories hardly consider the possibility for creating collective alternative media projects in the realms of production and distribution.

The shortcomings of existing approaches can be overcome by integrative multidimensional critical media theories/studies that try to bring together some or all of the various levels of critical media studies. One can identify some existing approaches that point into this direction. Integration and unification does not mean that difference is abolished at the expense of identity. It rather means a Hegelian dialectical sublation (Aufhebung), in which old elements are preserved and elevated to a new level. New qualities emerge by the interaction of the moments. Such a dialectical integration is a differentiated unity that is based on the principle of unity in diversity. It is a dialectical relation of identity and difference.

In the German tradition of the critique of the political economy of the media, Wulff Hund and Bärbel Kirchhoff-Hund (1980) stressed that capitalist mass communication has an economic and an ideological function. Horst Holzer (1973, 131; 1994, 202ff) and Manfred Knoche (2005) distinguish five repressive functions of the media. Hund, Holzer, and Knoche have tried to integrate the commodity- and the ideology-hypotheses. Also Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1973/1997, see also 2005) have stressed that the mass media have a commercial and an ideological dimension.

In the United States, Robert McChesney, Edward Herman, and Noam Chomsky established the integrative approach of the Political Economy of Communication (Chomsky 2006, Herman and Chomsky 1988, Herman and McCloskey 1997, McChesney 1992/1997, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2007; McChesney and Nicholis 2004). Herman and Chomsky (1988, 1-35) argue that the capitalist mass media are characterised by five filter functions (1. Profit-orientation, 2. Advertising, 3. Dominant information sources, 4. Flak, 5. Anticommunism). The first filter corresponds to the commodity role of the media, the other four to their ideological role. Herman and McChesney (1997) stress both the capital-economic and the ideological role of global media corporations. Although Herman, McChesney, and Chomsky are not optimistic concerning alternative developments, they stress that alternative media can exert counter-power against capitalist media corporations (See Herman and Chomsky 1988, 307; Herman and McCloskey 1997, McChesney and Nicholis 2004, McChesney 2007, chapters 22, 23). This approach attempts to integrate the commodity-, the ideology-, and the alternative media-hypotheses.

By trying to combine culturalism and structuralism in cultural studies, Stuart Hall (1980/2006) has established a unity of the reception- and the ideology-hypotheses in his model of communication encoding and decoding process. In newer publications, Hall together with colleagues works with a cultural circuit model that is based on the moments of production, consumption, representation, identity formation, and political regulation of the media (Du Gay et al. 1997, 3).

Similar to Hall, also Douglas Kellner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2005) argues for a unity of the manipulation- and the reception-hypothesis. He suggests a multiperspectival synthesis of critical theory and critical political economy on the one hand and cultural studies on the other hand. It should be accompanied by some positions of postmodern theory, feminism, and multicultural theory (Kellner 1995, 9). Such an approach combines the analysis of the political economy of communication and culture, text analysis, and reception analyses (Kellner 1999, 357).
Shane Gunster (2004) argues that seeing Adorno’s and Benjamin’s theories as complementing allows a balanced view on culture and the media that identifies contradictory manipulative potentials and imaginative alternative utopian potentials. Thinking together Adorno and Benjamin would re-dialecticise the thesis of the culture industry. With the help of Grossberg’s notion of articulation, Gunster tries to link cultural studies’ reception hypothesis to the Frankfurt school’s manipulation hypothesis and to Benjamin-inspired alternative media theory.

For Habermas, the mass media have on the one hand an authoritarian character caused by the potential colonisation by steering media, on the other hand an emancipatory potential that can advance consensus-oriented communicative action in the mass media-public sphere (1981, Vol. II, pp. 572-573). Habermas’s theory can both account for repressive media (colonisation) and alternative media (communicative action). In the *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas (1989) describes both the commodity- and the ideological character of modern mass media. In the book’s last chapter “On the Concept of Public Opinion,” he sees a counter-force and speaks of the potential for a critical publicity, which can be interpreted as an aspect of alternative media. Habermas theory can be seen as an attempted integration of the commodity-, the manipulation-, and the alternative media-hypotheses.

Vilém Flusser (1996a, b) has distinguished between dialogic and discursive forms of communication that can result in a participatory telematic society or a totalitarian media society. Flusser’s communicology can be read as a critical theory that integrates the manipulation- and the alternative media-hypotheses. He argues on the one hand that media manipulate by withholding information and limiting communication and on the other hand that media can support grassroots potentials.

For Herbert Marcuse (1964), media are on the one hand means that are used for advancing ideologies by simplifying reality and representing reality in one-dimensional, positivistic, undialectical ways so that antagonisms are factored out and false consciousness is created (Marcuse 1964, for a detailed discussion of Marcuse’s theory see Fuchs 2005a, b). Marcuse (1972, 55; 1975, 156) on the other hand considers the possibility that protest movements appropriate the media as a means of struggle. He sees such endeavours as antagonistic counter-part to the ideological character of the media. He speaks in this context of radical, free media as counter-institutions.

For Marcuse, also alternative forms of cultural reception are important. For him, contemporary culture is on the one hand in its one-dimensional form an expression of repressive desublimation (Marcuse 1964) and on the other hand in the form of counterculture an expression of “a new sensibility” that in its aesthetic dimension “can serve as a sort of gauge for a free society,” opens up imagination for “a universe of human relationships no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive exploitation of terror,” and allows to “see, hear, feel new things in a new way” by creating a new aesthetic environment (Marcuse 1969, 27, 37). Furthermore, for Marcuse the aesthetic form of authentic art is autonomous and revolutionary because it is “subversive of perception and understanding” (Marcuse 1978, xi).

Marcuse’s account of the media can be understood as a unity of the manipulation-/ideology-, the alternative media-, and the reception-hypothesis. In his analysis of culture, he stresses both its affirmative and transcendent potentials.
This discussion shows that there are approaches that try to integrate the commodity- and the ideology-hypothesis, the commodity-, the ideology-, and the alternative media-hypothesis, the ideology- and the reception hypothesis, and the ideology-, reception-, and the alternative media-hypothesis. However, all of these approaches leave out certain aspects of the repressive or emancipatory character of the media. An integrative critical theory of media and society can make use of dialectical logic in order to establish a dialectical unity of repressive and emancipatory aspects of the media and a dialectical unity of aspects of production, circulation, and reception. The underlying line of thought is that media reflect the antagonisms of capitalism and therefore have themselves an antagonistic character (Fuchs 2008). In a given societal situation, they are not to the same extent emancipatory and repressive, the distribution is based on the results of political struggles and tends to be uneven. Generally the ideology and commodity form of the media are predominant because dominant groups in capitalism have more resources, power, money, and means of mobilisation (Fuchs 2008). As a consequence, the probability that media are used in repressive ways is today larger than the possibility of emancipatory usage. The existing distribution of capital and power advances commercialisation and ideologisation of the media. Besides the question about the reality of the mass media there is also the one about their potentials. This question cannot be expressed in terms of possibilities. Possibilities are immanent potentials that can only be realised by activities and in class struggles. There are immanent possibilities to use, organise, and design media in alternative ways, i.e. participatory and critical potentials, and to interpret their contents in critical ways. These potentials are only partly or hardly realised today. In principle, there are possibilities to politically set structural conditions so that alternative media, critical production and reception of content are funded and supported. But such endeavours contradict capital interests because critical media question the capitalist totality. Alternative media politics are only realisable as politics of class struggle that make demands for redistribution and partial expropriation of capital (in the form of increasing capital taxation) in order to use the obtained resources for creating and supporting alternative projects and spaces.

Herbert Marcuse (1964) argued that the antagonism between potentials and actuality is tightening in late capitalism. This means that media in contemporary capitalism have large potentials for the socialisation of the mental means of production, especially based on global computer networks. But these potentials exist only as such in themselves and are only partly realised as long as they are subsumed under dominant interests and structures (See Fuchs 2008).

The emergence of new media technologies and products is the result of capital interests and political interests. A new media technology like the Internet is under the regime of capitalism always a sphere of capital accumulation, circulation, and consumption as well as a sphere of ideology production, circulation, and consumption (Fuchs 2008). At the same time new media technologies also pose potentials for the development of alternative forms of organising media and alternative media contents that are characterised by transformed conditions of production, circulation, and consumption. One and the same media technology (like Internet, TV, newspaper, radio, film, video, etc.) can be shaped by different interests and usage forms that contradict each other. So for example the Internet in the Iraq war 2003 was on the one hand a sphere, in which established mass media conducted
global war propaganda and transformed war images into capital. On the other hand, with the help of the Internet, the phenomenon of war blogging emerged, allowing anti-war activists to share their views and network. Of course, two contradicting events are never of equal relevance, as new media structures always have a dominative character under capitalism, and the extent to which alternative structures can emerge from them is uncertain and depends on the results of political struggles. The commodity and ideology functions of the media are almost automatically dominant and omnipresent, whereas the alternative media and alternative reception function is first of all only an unrealised potential. Only if it is possible to attain a certain freedom of action for critique by political demands and struggles, the probability that these potentials can be realised can be increased. Frequently, alternatives remain marginal, precarious, and unrealised because there is a structural dominance of uncritical thinking and dominative interests. In order to improve the conditions for realisation, media politics should be politics of criticising capitalism and of aiming at overcoming this very system. The struggle against the dominance of capital interests is also a struggle to create spaces for free thinking and action that allow humans to engage in critical discourse and to organise themselves against the existing totality.

The central political problem underlying media politics today is that public structures are eroded because the state gives tax incentives to corporations and redistributes income towards corporations and the rich by deregulating working conditions and creating the juridical conditions for the existence of low-paid precarious jobs. As a consequence, one finds also in the realm of the mass media an increased centralisation of wealth. Corporate profits increase relatively fast because wages decrease relatively. It is a general tendency in Europe and the USA that decreasing the wage share increases profitability. Table 5 shows that in the USA and Europe, profits have remained at continuous high levels in the past 30 years, whereas wages have relatively declined. This implies that profit growth has been achieved by an increase in the rate of surplus value, an intensification of the exploitation of labour by relatively decreasing wages.

The centralisation of ownership and wealth results in a situation in which a few actors dominate national and international public opinion and have huge influence on public institutions like the media, education, politics, culture, and welfare. If demanding partial capital expropriation by high capital taxation were successful, the obtained material resources could be used for supporting public affairs, such as education, health, social care, information, communication, and for decoupling them from capital interests. For the realm of the media, this means that by capital taxation non-commercial, non-profit, free access media projects could be created and supported. If in addition a certain share of labour time became free from the exposition to capital by the introduction of a universal unconditional basic income guarantee financed by capital taxation and taxing the rich, then material and temporal resources could be obtained that could function as foundation for critical action in critical media projects. Another precondition is the support of critical pedagogy and education that are decoupled from capital interests and enable young people to question domination and exploitation. Struggles for change are not hopeless. They pose the only chance for abolishing the existing totality. “If [...] [capitalism] is to change, and in a positive way, it is important that people who are dissatisfied with the status quo should not be overcome and rendered truly powerless by a
sense of hopelessness and cynicism. As Noam Chomsky said, ‘if you act like there is no possibility for change, you guarantee that there will be no change.’” (Herman and McChesney 1997, 205).

The approach advanced in this article is one that considers the media as antagonistic: They pose at the same time potentials for emancipation and repression. Mass media in capitalism automatically have a repressive character; they take on commodity- and ideological forms. But they also carry potentials for alternative production, content, distribution, and reception that are marginalised and only existent as immanent potentials that are not automatically realised. There are structural inequalities that decrease the possibilities of realisation for these alternative potentials. Politics of class struggle that primarily aim at redistribution and expropriation are the only way for increasing the possibilities and structural conditions for realising these potentials. Therefore the position advanced in this paper is neither a hypothesis of emancipation nor a hypothesis of repression, but rather a political perspective that situates the media within the societal totality and sees them as being embedded into political struggles. To take this position means to decentre the media, to avoid media essentialism, and to see that there is a dialectic relationship of the media and society.

The gap between the commodity hypothesis, the ideology- and manipulation-hypothesis, the reception hypothesis, and the alternative media hypothesis can be bridged. A way of establishing the connection is to find a theory that contains all elements. In my opinion, grounding critical media studies in Marx’s works can provide such an approach. There is a lack of space for presenting this argument in detail here. It can be shown that all four aspects can be mapped to Marx’s works. As an anticipation of this work, I will here present the theoretical model that is underlying the argument. It aims to show how commodity production, ideology, reception, and alternative media are connected.

For a systematic location of the media in capitalism, one can take as a starting point Marx’s circuit of commodity metamorphosis and the accumulation of capital, as it is described in volume 2 of Capital (MEW 24, MECW 36).
Which role do the media have in the circuit of capital accumulation? A systematic account can be given based on the following distinction:

- The role of the media in commodity production (Commodity hypothesis)
- The role of the media in commodity circulation and consumption (Reception hypothesis)
- Media and ideology (Ideology hypothesis)
- Alternative media (Alternative media hypothesis)

Capital accumulation within the media sphere takes place in both the media content sphere and the media infrastructure sphere. These two realms together form the sphere of media capital.

The media commodity hypothesis refers to vertical and horizontal integration, media concentration, media convergence, media globalisation, the integration of media capital and other types of capital, the rationalisation of production, the globalisation of production, circulation, and trade; intra-company communication, advertising and marketing. Processes of vertical integration make the boundaries between the two systems fuzzy. Concentration processes and horizontal integration, which are inherent features of capital accumulation, shape each of the two spheres. Media convergence is a specific feature of media infrastructure capital. The two realms together are factors that influence the globalisation of the culture industry. The realm of the economy is the one of capital accumulation in non-media industries and services. It is partly integrated with the media sector due to corporate integration processes. Media technologies advance the rationalisation of production in this realm as well as in the media content industry. Furthermore, they advance the globalisation of production, circulation, and trade. These globalisation processes are also factors that in return advance the development of new media technologies. Media technologies are also used for intra-company communication. Rationalisation, globalisation, and intra-company communication are processes that aim at maximising profits by decreasing the investment cost of capital (constant and variable capital) and by advancing relative surplus value production (more production in less time). The media content industry is important for advertising and marketing commodities in the circulation process of commodities, which is at the same time the realisation process of capital, in which surplus value is transformed into money profit.

The ideology hypothesis refers to media content capital and its relation to recipients. Media content that creates false consciousness is considered an ideological content. Alternative media is a sphere that challenges the capitalist media industry by developing alternative ways of organising and producing media to create critical contents that challenge capitalism. Media content depends on reception where ideologies are reproduced and potentially challenged.

The use value of media and media technologies is that they allow humans to inform themselves and to communicate. In capitalist society, use value is dominated by the exchange value of products, which become commodities. The media take on commodity form, their use value only becomes available for consumers through exchanges that accumulate money capital in the hands of capitalists. Media and technologies as concrete products represent the use value side of information and communication, whereas the monetary price of the media represents the exchange value side of information and communication. The commodity hypothesis discusses
the exchange value aspect of the media. The ideology hypothesis shows how the dominance of the use value of the media by exchange value creates a role of the media in the legitimisation and reproduction of domination. The two hypotheses are connected through the contradictory double character of media as use values and exchange values. The media as commodities are in relation to money use values that can realise their exchange value, i.e. their price, in money form. Money is an exchange value in relation to the media. It realises its use value in the media commodities. Consumers are interested in the use value aspect of media and technology, whereas capitalists are interested in the exchange value aspect that helps them to accumulate money capital. The use value of media and technology only becomes available to consumers through complex processes, in which capitalists exchange the commodities they control with money. This means that the use value of media and technology is only possible through the exchange value that they have in relation to money. Commodification is a basic process that underlies media and technology in capitalism. Use value and exchange value are “bilateral polar opposites” (MEW 13, 72) of media and technology in capitalist society. Once media and technology reach consumers, they have taken on commodity form and are therefore likely to have ideological characteristics. The sphere of alternative media challenges the commodity character of the media. It aims at a reversal so that use value becomes the dominant feature of media and technology by the sublation of their exchange value. Processes of alternative reception transcend the ideological character of the media – the recipients are empowered in questioning the commodified character of the world they live in.

Conclusion

I have suggested to make a rather broad definition of critical communication and media studies and to use the distinction between ontology, epistemology, and axiology for doing so. Critical communication and media studies have been defined as studies that focus ontologically on the analysis of media, communication, and culture in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, oppression, and control by employing at the epistemological level all theoretical and/or empirical means that are necessary for doing so in order to contribute at the praxeological level to the establishment of a participatory, co-operative society. This definition implies that critical communication and media studies are inherently political, normative, and partial in the interest of the dominated, the exploited, and the oppressed. It has been stressed that media and communication are just like and because of capitalist society antagonistic and therefore have both emancipatory and repressive potentials that are realised or suppressed to certain extents based on the outcome of class and power struggles.

I then have continued to distinguish various ideal-type versions and focuses of critical communication and media studies in the form of a typology. The typology is based on the Marxian distinction between production, circulation, and consumption. Representatives of the commodity hypothesis argue that the media are not primarily means of manipulation and for advancing ideologies, but spheres of capital accumulation. The manipulation and ideology hypothesis says that the media are used as tools that manipulate people, advance ideologies, forestall societal transformation, and create false consciousness, false needs, and a one-di-
mensional universe of thought, language, and action. Underlying the alternative media hypothesis is the assumption that there are alternative ways of doing and making media for critical ends. Representatives of the reception hypothesis argue that reception is a complex and antagonistic process that provides potentials for oppositional interpretations and actions. Integrative critical communication and media studies combine and relate several or all of the identified roles of media and communication. A model of the media in capitalism was outlined that tries to show that the four aspects of critical media and communication studies are connected. Future works will try to show that this connection has already been established in the works of Marx and that therefore these works are important for finding common aspects of the various strands of critical media and communication studies.

Commodity, manipulation, ideology, alternative media, alternative reception – what are these categories for? Take the example of communication media and industry in Nazi Germany. Edwin Black (2001) in his book *IBM and the Holocaust* has shown that IBM assisted the Nazis in their attempt to extinguish the Jews, ethnic minorities, communists, socialists, gay people, the handicapped, and others by selling punch card systems to them and maintaining these systems. IBM sold communication systems to the Nazis as commodities for gaining profits. The Nazis made use of media such as the single-channel radio known as the Volksempfänger, for diffusing their fascist ideology. Resistance groups, which were primarily Communist in nature, tried to make use of alternative media such as critical leaflets, post cards, or papers that they had to create, print, and distribute all by themselves. In order to find out what was really going on in the war and to escape the manipulated Nazi propaganda, some of the Austrians and Germans adopted the alternative reception practice of listening illegally to BBC. Cases have been documented that show that penal servitude was used as punishment for listening to what was termed “Feindpropaganda” (enemy propaganda). So for example, the Viennese janitor Leopoldine Amort was sentenced to 18 months penitentiary in maximum-security prison on April 25, 1942 for the “crime of listening to foreign radio stations and propagating news reports of foreign radio stations” (Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance, Database of Gestapo Victims, http://de.doew.braintrust.at/gestapoopferdb.html, accessed on August 19, 2008). An excerpt from the verdict against three Communist resistance fighters reads: “The defendants [Ferdinand] Kosztelny, Anderst und [Johann] Fried have paid membership fees to the Communist Party of Austria up to and beyond the beginning of the military campaign against the Bolsheviks. Furthermore they have distributed subversive pamphlets and have (except Kosztelny) courted like-minded persons for the payment of contributions. Therefore they are sentenced to death and lifelong loss of civil rights because of subversive activities” (ibid.). Ferdinand Anderst, Johann Fried, and Ferdinand Kosztelny were executed on October 22 1943 at the Regional Court Vienna.

Marx defined critique as “the *categoric imperative to overthrow all relations* in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence” (MEW 1, 385). The examples just given should have shown that media and communication are implicated in domination and therefore make the Marxian categoric imperative so important. Critical media and communication studies in its various forms are needed as projects that help keeping this categoric imperative alive in an age of media, communication, and information.
References:


