

# Media and Left

*Edited by*

Savaş Çoban



BRILL

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# Culture, Communication, & Ideology = Forms of Work

*Christian Fuchs*

## Introduction

The relationship of work and ideology is a largely unclarified issue in Marxist theory. There are on the one hand Critical Discourse Analysts who analyse ideology as texts, without thinking about the circumstance that ideology is produced by people working in specific contexts under specific conditions (in marketing and PR agencies, consultancies, media organisations, press agencies, etc). On the other hand, the sociology of cultural labour tends to analyse working conditions of cultural workers without thinking about the ideological effects that many cultural products tend to have under capitalist conditions and how ideology influences work and the economy in general. It is therefore important to theorise the relationship of work on the one hand and culture and ideology on the other hand. This chapter wants to contribute to this task.

In Critical Discourse Analysis, the discussion of the relationship of work/labour and language/ideology is conspicuous by its absence. So for example in Norman Fairclough's (2010) 592 page long book *Critical Discourse Analysis*, the terms labour and work are hardly used and if so then predominantly not for signifying work processes, but New Labour. There are no chapters dedicated to the relationship of labour and ideology, work and language. A similar assessment can be made of Fairclough's (1995) book *Media Discourse*, Teun van Dijk's *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998), *Discourse & Power* (2008), *Society and Discourse* (2009), the collection *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (2011), or the methods book *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (Wodak and Meyer 2009). Questions relating to the labour of producing ideologies, the role and relationship of language/ideology and work/labour in society, is largely absent in and a blindspot of Critical Discourse Analysis. It tends to neglect basic assumptions of cultural materialism (Williams 1977). Although it is materialist in its basic critique of capitalism, it has thus far not much engaged with the relationship of language and work.

Section 2 discusses examples of a work/culture-dualism (Habermas, Holzkamp). Section 3 introduces some foundations of Raymond Williams cultural materialism that are used in section 4 for conceptualising culture as a

form of work. Based on a reading of Ferruccio Rossi-Landi's semiotics, section 5 argues for understanding communication as work. Section 6 based on these foundations draws a distinction between ideological labour and critical work.

### **Work/Communication-Dualism: Jürgen Habermas and Klaus Holzkamp on Communication and Work**

Habermas' theory of communicative action makes a sharp distinction between, on the one, hand purposive (instrumental, strategic) action that is orientated on success and, on the other hand, communicative action that is orientated on reaching understanding (Habermas 1984, 285f). Work is for Habermas always an instrumental, strategic and purposive form of action, whereas communication's goal is understanding. Habermas, just like Holzkamp, therefore separates work and communication.

In the article *Arbeit und Interaction (Work and Interaction)*, Habermas (1968) argues that Hegel (1803/1804, 1805/1806) in his Jena lectures on the philosophy of spirit argued that work and interaction are two ways how human beings relate to the world, organize the relationship between subject and object, and thereby constitute their self-conscious minds. Consciousness and the mind would be media of communication. The difference between work and interaction would be that the first is a form of strategic action and the second oriented on understanding. Strategic action would make decisions without trying to reach understanding with others (Habermas 1968, 22). Both work and interaction would constitute the external nature of humans, their relational being. In work, there is a relation to nature organized by tools. In communication, there is a relation to other humans organized by language and its symbols. Work and interaction could not be reduced to each other (Habermas 1968, 3), but they would be dialectically connected: "But now also instrumental action, as soon as it enters the category of the actual spirit in the form of societal work, is embedded into a network of interactions and is therefore itself dependent on the communicative boundary conditions of every possible cooperation" (Habermas 1968, 32, translation from German). Habermas argues that Hegel would have after his Jena time (1801–1807) given up the concept of the dialectic of work and interaction because he became convinced that nature and work are just attributes of spirit and can therefore be reduced to the dialectical development of spirit. Marx in contrast would have reduced communicative action to instrumental action (Habermas 1968, 45).

In the *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas (1984, 1987) formalized the earlier drawn distinction between work and interaction in his own theory

in the form of a distinction between instrumental-strategic rationality and communicative rationality. Habermas understands rationality as “problem-solving action” (Habermas 1984, 12). He introduces a typology of action, in which he differentiates action types based on action situations (non-social or social) and action orientation (oriented to success, oriented to reaching understanding). This results in the distinction between instrumental action, strategic action and communicative action. Instrumental and strategic action are oriented on success and driven by “egocentric calculations of success” (Habermas 1984, 286). Instrumental action means that an actor identifies and uses means in order to achieve ends and maximize his/her benefits (Habermas 1984, 285, 85). Strategic action is instrumental action in a social situation with rational opponents so that the task is to beat the opponent or be more successful than him/her (Habermas 1984, 285). In contrast, communicative action the action situation is social and the orientation is “reaching understanding” (Habermas 1984, 286). “In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basic of common situation definitions” (Habermas 1984, 286).

The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of *interpretation* refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus. [...] language is given a prominent place in this model.

HABERMAS 1984, 86

Reaching understanding in communicative action would require the three validity claims of truth, rightness and truthfulness (Habermas 1984, 99). Habermas’ distinction between instrumental and communicative action is reflected in his distinction between systems and the lifeworld. He locates work/labour in the interchange relationship between the economic system and the private sphere that is part of the lifeworld (Habermas 1987, 320). This relationship would be determined by the systemic steering media of money and power (exchange of money in the form of the wage for the control of labour power). Habermas (1976, 151) argues that work and language were necessary preconditions for the emergence of humans and society. Reconstructing Historical Materialism would require separating “the level of communicative action from the level of instrumental and strategic actions that are united in societal cooperation” (Habermas 1976, 160, translation from German to

English). Historical progress would only be possible by developing the forms of social integration and the productive forces (Habermas 1976, 194).

Habermas consistently used the distinction between communication and work that he took from Hegel's Jena philosophy for creating a theory of modern society. Communication and work represent for him two different logics of society, an emancipatory and an instrumental one. He is critical of money and power's colonization of lifeworld communication (Habermas 1987) and so stresses the importance of defending communication against instrumental logic. Habermas' political imperative is definitely laudable because it helps to stress that there is a society beyond capitalism and that a true society is not steered by capital and domination. But the question is if it is feasible to dualistically separate communication and work – an approach that Habermas characterizes as media dualism (Habermas 1987, 281). There are several theoretical limits of Habermas' work/communication dualism:

- In a general sense, we can say that reaching communicative understanding and any form of communication is a form of instrumental action: the means of language is used for achieving the goal of relating oneself to other humans and reaching a joint understanding of the world.
- Communication in modern society is not an immune sphere: Ideologies are forms of communication and language that are highly instrumental. Ideologies instrumentalize language and meanings for justifying exploitation and domination. Communication thereby becomes an instrument of domination. Within communication studies, a specific field called strategic communication has developed. It studies how communication can be used for influencing and persuading specific audiences of particular purposes, especially in marketing and politics (see Hülsmann and Pfeffermann 2011, Paul 2011). Strategic communication is just another term for propaganda that serves capitalist and bureaucratic purposes. So communication is not immune from the logic of instrumentalizing humans and speech for domination, but can serve quite different purposes.
- Work not only serves strategic-instrumental purposes, but can be quite altruistic and motivated by helping others and fostering the common good that benefits all. Marx was convinced that an entire society can be built on the logic of common goods. Limiting the notion of work to strategic-instrumental action deprives theory of a vocabulary for conceptualizing social activities that produce use-values in a society based on solidarity, common goods and voluntary work.

What distinguishes humans from animals is that they have a complex form of verbal language and communication, have self-consciousness, morals and

anticipatory thought. But how did these capacities historically emerge? Klaus Holzkamp's (1985) *Critical Psychology* has engaged thoroughly with this question. Holzkamp (1985, 113f) argues that communication is an optical and acoustical bidirectional/dialogical/reciprocal relationship between organism, in which information is exchanged and social meaning is given to signals and symbols. Understood in this way, communication is not specific for humans, but can also be found in the animal world, where animals communicate for purposes such as procreation, breeding, hunting, defending their territory, warning each other, etc.

Historically, practical knowledge of how to manage reality had to be fixed and organised in some form, which required cooperative work between humans on the one hand and the need to communicate and store experiences on the other hand (Holzkamp 1985, 177, 211f). Holzkamp (1985, 224) assumes that verbal communication emerged in the development between the first qualitative dominance shift (the reversal of means and ends) and the second one (the emergence of societal-historical development): cooperative work in close range would have required coordination activities and as the eyes and vision would have been used for constantly monitoring the work process and the hands and the body for changing the objects of work, the use of the mouth for coordinating work would have been a logical step (Holzkamp 1985, 224). The development of speech that uses categories for signifying specific parts of reality would have been a practical requirement of the cooperative work process (Holzkamp 1985, 226–229). Concept formation would have been practical and the emerging phonetic concepts would have been practical concepts that described tools, objects and products. So for example “the planning and coordination of activities in the production of horizontally standing and flat boards, i.e. ‘tables’, requires a concept of ‘horizontal’ and one of ‘flat’” (Holzkamp 1985, 227).

The development of learning capacities and anticipatory thinking together with verbal communication would have enabled humans to speak about relations and circumstances even if they were not immediately present (Holzkamp 1985, 228). As cooperative work became ever more complex and ever more transcended spatial and temporal distances, it was necessary to find trans-individual forms of communication and information transmission. So whereas the organization of cooperative work required the development of human speech, the increasing spatio-temporal distancing of the cooperative work process required forms of mediated communication, which historically resulted in the development of writing and painting as means for preserving, storing and communicating information (Holzkamp 1985, 230f).

Holzkamp explains in a logically consistent and convincing manner how the development of society, work, speech and communication co-evolved in a

dialectical manner. He grounds his approach in Marx's theory. Marx argued that the mind is "burdened" with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language" (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 49). Marx stresses the material dimensions of the mind and language: the human being, the brain, the air that transports sound. "Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me; the animal does not 'relate' itself to anything, it does not 'relate' itself at all" (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 49). For Marx, language and consciousness are "a social production" and remain so "as long as men exist at all" (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 50). By saying that language is practical and social, Marx means that it has historically arisen in the course of the organisation of economic production that became a social process. Holzkamp reflects this insight by arguing that communication and language emerged from the need of practical knowledge in the work process that became ever more complex and thereby a cooperative and social process.

Work is for Holzkamp a category of the theory of society that captures "the objective-economic aspects of the production and reproduction of societal life" (Holzkamp 1985, 234, translation from German to English). Work is "collective objectified transformation of nature and the control of natural forces for the precautionary disposal over the common living conditions" (Holzkamp 1985, 176f, translation from German to English). He uses in contrast the notion of activity for characterising individual behaviour, "individual life activities" of humans that organise the "maintenance/development of his/her individual existence" (Holzkamp 1985, 234, translation from German to English). Activities would include psychological processes and the individual contributions to societal production and reproduction by work – "the work activities as psychological aspect of societal work" (Holzkamp 1985, 234, translation from German). Meanings would be developed in society and influence individual activities (Holzkamp 1985, 234).

Holzkamp argues that individual behaviour and psychological processes are human activities, whereas the cooperative organisation of the production of goods and services that sustain human existence, processes that are never possible by single individuals, by changing, transforming and organising nature are work processes. He sees a dialectic between human individuals and collective cooperation in work processes.

Holzkamp in drawing the distinction between work and activity makes the basic mistake to assume that work is only a human collaborative transformation of natural resources so that goods and services (use-values) emerge

that satisfy human needs. Holzkamp's approach here resembles Habermas' theory of communicative action that makes a sharp distinction between on the one hand purposive (instrumental, strategic) action that is orientated on success and on the other hand communicative action that is orientated on reaching understanding (Habermas 1984, 285f). Work is for Habermas always an instrumental, strategic and purposive form of action, whereas communication's goal is to create understanding. Both Habermas and Holzkamp separate work and communication.

### Raymond Williams' Cultural Materialism

In *Marxism and Literature*, Raymond Williams questions the Marxism's historical tendency to see culture as "dependent, secondary, 'superstructural': a realm of 'mere' ideas, beliefs, arts, customs, determined by the basic material history" (Williams 1977, 19). He discusses various Marxist concepts that Marxist theories have used for discussing the relationship of the economy and culture: determination, reflection, reproduction, mediation, homology. These approaches would all assume a relationship between the economy and culture with a varying degree of causal determination or mutual causality. But all of them would share the assumption of "the separation of 'culture' from material social life" (Williams 1977, 19) that Williams (1977, 59) considers to be "idealist." The problem of these approaches would be that they are not "materialist enough" (Williams 1977, 92).

Raymond Williams (1977, 111) formulates as an important postulate of Cultural Materialism that "[c]ultural work and activity are not [...] a superstructure" because people would use physical resources for leisure, entertainment and art. Combining Williams' assumptions that cultural work is material and economic and that the physical and ideational activities underlying the existence of culture are interconnected means that culture is a totality that connects all physical and ideational production processes that are connected and required for the existence of culture.

Williams (1977, 139) concludes that Cultural Materialism needs to see "the complex unity of the elements" required for the existence of culture: ideas, institutions, formations, distribution, technology, audiences, forms of communication and interpretation, worldviews (138f). A sign system would involve the social relations that produce it, the institutions in which it is formed and its role as a cultural technology (Williams 1977, 140). In order to avoid the "real danger of separating human thought, imagination and concepts from 'men's material life-process'" (Williams 1989, 203), one needs like Marx to focus on the

“totality of human activity” (Williams 1989, 203) when discussing culture. We “have to emphasise cultural practice as from the beginning social and material” (Williams 1989, 206). The “productive forces of ‘mental labour’ have, in themselves, an inescapable material and thus social history” (Williams 1989, 211). Marx expressed the basic assumption of Cultural Materialism well by saying that the “production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men” (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 42). The production of ideas is therefore the “language of real life” (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 42). “Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms” (Marx and Engels 1845/1846, 42). Thinking and communication are for Marx processes of production that are embedded into humans’ everyday life and work. They produce their own capacities and realities of thinking and communication in work and social relations.

### **Cultural Production as a Form of Work**

Inspired by Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism, it is feasible to argue for a broad understanding of digital labour that transcends the cultural idealism of the early digital labour debate and some works in the cultural industries school. On the one hand Williams refuses the separation of culture and the economy as well as base and superstructure. On the other hand he maintains that culture as a signifying system is a distinct system of society. How can we make sense of these claims that at a first sight seem to be mutually exclusive? If one thinks dialectically, then a concept of culture as material and necessarily economic and at the same time distinct from the economy is feasible: culture and politics are dialectical sublations (*Aufhebung*) of the economy. Sublation means in Hegelian philosophy that a system or phenomenon is preserved, eliminated and lifted up. Culture is not the same as the economy, it is more than the sum of various acts of labour, it has emergent qualities – it communicates meanings in society – that cannot be found in the economy alone. But at the same time, the economy is preserved in culture: culture is not independent from labour, production and physicality, but requires and incorporates all of them.

The Austrian philosopher of information Wolfgang Hofkirchner has introduced stage models as a way for philosophically conceptualising the logic connections between different levels of organization. In a stage model, “one step taken by a system in question – that produces a layer – depends on the stage

taken prior to that but cannot be reversed! [...] layers – that are produced by steps – build upon layers below them but cannot be reduced to them!” (Hofkirchner 2013, 123f). Emergence is the foundational principle of stage model (Hofkirchner 2013, 115): a specific level of organisation of matter has emergent qualities so that the systems organized on this level are more than the sum of their parts, to which they cannot be reduced. An organisation level has new qualities that are grounded in the underlying systems and levels that are preserved on the upper level and through synergies produce new qualities of the upper level. In the language of dialectical philosophy this means that the emergent quality of an organisation level is a sublation (*Aufhebung*) of the underlying level.

Applying a stage model allows to identify and relate different levels of cultural and digital work (see Figure 2.1). Cultural work is a term that encompasses organisational levels of work that are at the same time distinct and dialectically connected: cultural work has an emergent quality, namely information work that creates content, that is based on and grounded in physical cultural work that creates information technologies in agricultural and industrial work processes. Physical work takes place inside and outside of culture: it creates information technologies and its components (cultural physical work) as well as other products (non-cultural physical work) that do not primarily have symbolic functions in society (such as cars, tooth brushes and cups). Cars, tooth brushes and cups do not primarily have the role of informing others or communicating with others, but rather help humans achieve the tasks of transport, cleanliness and nutrition. Culture and information work however have feedback on these products and create symbolic meanings used by companies for marketing these products. Cultural work is a unity of physical cultural work




FIGURE 2.1 *A stage model of cultural work*

and information work that interact with each other, are connected and at the same time distinct.

The production of meaning, social norms, morals and the communication of meanings, norms and morals in social processes taking place in the cultural system is a work process: it creates cultural use-values. Culture requires on the one hand human creativity for creating cultural content and on the other hand specific forms and media for storage and communication. Work that creates information and communication through language is specific for work conducted in the cultural system: informational and communication work. For having social effects in society, information and communication are organised (stored, processed, transported, analysed, transformed, created) with the help of information and communication technologies, such as computers, TV, radio, newspapers, books, recorded films, recorded music, language, etc. These technologies are produced by physical cultural work. Culture encompasses a) physical and informational work that create cultural technologies (information and communication technologies) and b) information work that creates information and communication. These two types of work act together in order to produce and reproduce culture. *Meanings and judgements are emergent qualities of culture that are created by informational work, but take on relative autonomy that has effects inside but also outside the economic system. This means that specific forms of work create culture, but culture cannot be reduced to the economy – it has emergent qualities.*

Communication is the “passing of ideas, information, and attitudes from person to person,” whereas communications means the “institutions and forms in which ideas, information, and attitudes are transmitted and received” (Williams 1962, 9). Information and communication are meaning-making activities created by informational work. Physical cultural work creates communications as institutions and forms that organise the creation and passing of information in social processes.

Marx identified two forms of information work: The first results in cultural goods that “exist separately from the producer, i.e. they can circulate in the interval between production and consumption as commodities, e.g. books, paintings and all products of art as distinct from the artistic achievement of the practising artist.” In the second, “the product is not separable from the act of producing” (Marx 1867, 1047f). The first requires a form, institution or technology that stores and transports information, as in the case of computer-mediated communication, the second uses language as main medium (e.g. theatre). The first requires physical cultural work for organising storage, organisation and transport of information, the second is possible based only on information work.

If culture were merely symbolic, mind, spirit, 'immaterial', superstructural, informational, a world of ideas, then digital labour as expression of culture clearly would exclude the concrete works of mining and hardware assemblage that are required for producing digital media. Based on Williams' Cultural Materialism it is in contrast to the position of Cultural Idealism feasible to argue that digital labour includes both the creation of physical products and information that are required for the existence and usage of digital technologies. Some digital workers create hardware, others hardware components, minerals, software or content that are all objectified in or the outcome of the application of digital technologies.

In order to illustrate his point that culture is material, Williams mentions a passage from Marx's *Grundrisse*:

Productive labour is only that which produces capital. Is it not crazy, asks e.g. (or at least something similar) Mr Senior, that the piano maker is a productive worker, but not the piano player, although obviously the piano would be absurd without the piano player? But this is exactly the case. The piano maker reproduces capital; the pianist only exchanges his labour for revenue. But doesn't the pianist produce music and satisfy our musical ear, does he not even to a certain extent produce the latter? He does indeed: his labour produces something; but that does not make it productive labour in the economic sense; no more than the labour of the madman who produces delusions is productive. Labour becomes productive only by producing its own opposite.

MARX 1857/1858, 305

Williams remarks that today, other than in Marx's time, "the production of music (and not just its instruments) is an important branch of capitalist production" (Williams 1977, 93).

If the economy and culture are two separate realms, then building the piano is work and part of the economy and playing it is not work, but culture. Marx leaves however no doubt that playing the piano produces a use-value that satisfies human ears and is therefore a form of work. As a consequence, the production of music must just like the production of the piano be an economic activity. Williams (1977, 94) stresses that cultural materialism means to see the material character of art, ideas, aesthetics and ideology and that when considering piano making and piano playing it is important to discover and describe "relations between all these practices" and to not assume "that only some of them are material."

Besides the piano maker and the piano player there is also the composer of music. All three works are needed and necessarily related in order to guarantee

the existence of piano music. Fixing one of these three productive activities categorically as culture and excluding the others from it limits the concept of culture and does not see that one cannot exist without the other. Along with this separation come political assessments of the separated entities. A frequent procedure is to include the work of the composer and player and to exclude the work of the piano maker. Cultural elitists then argue that only the composer and player are truly creative, whereas vulgar materialists hold that only the piano maker can be a productive worker because he works with his hands and produces an artefact. Both judgments are isolationist and politically problematic.

### Communication as a Form of Work

Most Marxist approaches that have given attention to the communication process at a theoretical level have focused on the communicative character of work, but have neglected the question if communication is work. A few exceptions can be found in the political economy of communication-approach, such as the works by Wulf Hund (1976), Hund/Kirchhoff-Hund (1980) and Dan Schiller (1996) have stressed the importance of not separating work and communication.

If cultural production in specific work processes creates symbols that have meaning in society, then the communication of such meanings via language and media must also be a work process. An approach that helps to conceptualise communication as work is Ferruccio Rossi-Landi's (1977, 1983) Marxist semiotics. For him, language and communication are work that produce words, sentences, interconnected sentences, arguments, speeches, essays, lectures, books, codes, artworks, literature, science, groups, civilisation and the linguistic world as totality (Rossi-Landi 1983, 133–136). As “words and messages do not exist in nature” (Rossi-Landi 1983, 36), they must be the products of human work that generates use-values. They are use-values because they satisfy the human needs of expression, communication and social relations (Rossi-Landi 1983, 37). “Like the other products of human work, words, expressions and messages have a use-value or utility insofar as they satisfy needs, in this case, the basic needs for expression and communication with all the changing stratifications that have historically grown up around them” (Rossi-Landi 1983, 50).

Rossi-Landi (1983, 47) argues that language is a material instrument that is constant capital and that linguistic labour power is variable capital. A linguistic community would be a “huge market in which words, expressions and messages circulate as commodities” (Rossi-Landi 1983, 49). Words would have

exchange value because in language they stand in relations to others words, whereas messages would have exchange value in the exchange of messages between humans (Rossi-Landi 1983, 49). Rossi-Landi (1983) conceptualises the linguistic value and exchange-value of expressions by saying that Marx's logic of  $x$  commodity A =  $y$  commodity B has in language a homology when one expression's meaning is compared to another, for example: "art is an institution" and art "is a particular theoretical moment of the Spirit" (Rossi-Landi 1983, 61).

Rossi-Landi's approach is important, especially because he interprets human communication processes as work and in this context uses Marx's general notion of work. But it has limits in that it uses the terms linguistic capital, linguistic market and linguistic value just like linguistic work as anthropological concepts. Whereas work is for Marx a general concept characteristic for all societies, capital, markets and value are not anthropological features of humans and society, but rather historical features of specific class societies. A homology of language with capital, markets and value therefore naturalises and essentialises historical categories. The logical consequence is that capital, markets and values appear to be characteristics of all societies in Rossi-Landi's approach. Rossi-Landi's approach is feasible, where he argues that language is work, but it fails when he argues that language is a form of trade, in which we can find capital, exchange-value and markets.

Although linguistic products in capitalist societies or other societies that use markets as economic distribution mechanisms can be traded as commodities, this does not imply that language is always a commodity that is exchanged on markets. A market is a mechanism of exclusion in that it gives you only access to a good or service if you in return provide a good or service that is considered to have equal value. In everyday life, many communications do not assume the logic of getting something in return whose value can be quantified. Mothers and fathers talk a lot to their babies out of altruism and love, but do not expect the babies to return words and sentences that are equally meaningful. In fact, the babies would not be able to learn to spoke if their parents would apply the logic of markets, commodities and exchange-value because they then would not much speak to them. Language and our brains are in general not constant capital, but rather a means of linguistic production – instruments of linguistic work. Human beings and their languaging-capacity and -activity are not variable capital, but rather they are the subjects of linguistic work. It is only in capitalism and other market-based societies that linguistic products can turn into capital and commodities, brains and language into constant capital and linguistic work capacity into variable capital. Under such circumstances, linguistic products such as books are the expenditure of specific

hours of labour power. When the book is sold, one can only read it if one pays a specific price for it (except if illegal copies are distributed).

An information process is according to Peirce a triadic relationship, in which an object is represented as a sign and produces certain mental effects that we term interpretation. Semiosis is the process  $O - S - M$ , in which objects  $O$  are signified by signs  $S$  that are interpreted in the form of meanings  $M$ . Semiosis is not a static process, but continuous and dynamic because existing meanings are the starting point for new thought and communication processes through which meanings are produced and differentiated. Semiosis as dialectical process takes place both in individual cognition and communication and thereby connects individual and social human existence. It operates as a threefold, nested, emergent and interconnected process (see Figure 2.2):

1. 'Individual semiosis' is a mental thought process – cognition – in which an individual interprets the world by mentally representing parts of reality by signs in his/her imagination and creating meanings that interpret the objects and signs.
2. Individual semiosis enables and constrains and is enabled and constrained, i.e. conditions and is conditioned, by 'social semiosis': human social relations are communicative relationships, in which humans use language, i.e. systems of grammatically connected signs that form words and sentences and are expressed in spoken, written, bodily or visual




FIGURE 2.2 *The tripleC model of semiosis/information*

forms, so that meaning is mutually communicated. One individual A communicates parts of the meanings s/he gives to the world to another individual B who communicates meanings that s/he gives to the world back to A. Social semiosis means that the meanings of at least two humans are changed by communication processes. These changes of meanings can be more or less substantial. In some cases qualitatively new interpretations, values or knowledge are created, in other cases the communicated information is recognised and interpreted, but makes no profound changes. Individual semiosis emerges from humans' interactions with the natural and social environment and enables social semiosis. Cognition is conditioned by communication, which in turn conditions cognition.

3. Many communications are ephemeral and do not bring about more substantial structural changes in society. Some communications and social relations however are transformative, i.e. they result in changes in society, such as the formation of a new social system, the differentiation of an existing social system, the emergence of new rules or resources. In such cases, social semiosis becomes *structural/societal semiosis*: communication turns in co-operation/collaboration, in which several humans act together in such a way that new structures emerge or existing ones are transformed. Communication conditions co-operation and co-operation conditions communication.

In the tripleC model of information (Fuchs and Hofkirchner 2005, Hofkirchner 2013), cognition conditions and is conditioned by communication that conditions and is conditioned by co-operation. Semiosis has an individual, a social and a societal level. It is a dialectical information process that is organised as a dialectic of dialectics: the semiosis of cognition mutually interacts with the semiosis of communication in human practices and relations, from which the semiosis of society that transforms social structures can emerge.

Information processes do not stand outside of matter and do not form a second substance besides or related to matter. Information – the semiosis of semi-oses and the dialectic of dialectics of cognition, communication and co-operation) – is material itself, it has the potential to transform structures. On the cognitive and communicative level of the individual and social relations, semiosis transforms cognitive structures, i.e. patterns of established meanings of individuals, to which new meanings are added. On the co-operative level of society, semiosis reproduces and/or transforms structures of society, such as rules, resources, dominant and hegemonic social values, organisations, institutions, etc. Reproduction and transformation take place within the economic, the political and the cultural system through communicative and collaborative

work processes. Semiosis and structuration cannot be opposed because individual and social semiosis reproduces and changes individual autopoietic structures of human cognition, whereas societal semiosis reproduces and changes structures in the economic, the political and the cultural systems of society.

How is semiosis (the information dialectic of cognition, communication and co-operation) related to work? Rossi-Landi conceptualised the work process that he parallelised with the communication process as a dialectic of material, operations (instruments, worker, working operations) and product (see Withalm 2006). He thereby however relates two objects and not the human subject (its work mental and physical work capacity and labour power) and the objects of work to each other so that his system is not a subject-object-dialectic. Language is the result of human activities over many generations. Words are not natural objects, but produced by humans together in their culture. As being produced by humans, information is the product of human work. Hands, head, ears, mouth – body and brain – work together in order to enable speech. Work has a dual character, it has physical and social dimensions. Thinking and speaking that result in the production of information and symbols form the physical aspect, human relations the social dimension of communication.

Information can be conceived as a threefold process of cognition, communication and co-operation (Fuchs and Hofkirchner 2005). Table 2.1 below gives an overview of the dimensions of the cognitive, communicative and cooperative dimensions of information work (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013).

TABLE 2.1 *The subject, object and subject-object of cognitive, communicative and co-operative work*

	Subject	Object of work	Instruments of work	Product of work
Cognition = human brain work	Human being	Experiences	Brain	Thoughts, cognitive patterns, ideas
Communication = human group work	Group of humans	Thoughts	Brain, mouth, ears	Meaning
Co-operation = collaborative human group work	Group of humans	Meaning	Brain, mouth, ears, body	Information product with shared and co-created meaning

Figure 2.3 below shows that these three processes are connected dialectically and form together the process of information work. Each of the three behaviours – cognition, communication and co-operation – is a work process: cognition is work of the human brain, communication work of human groups and co-operative collaborative work of human groups. Communication is based on cognition and uses the products of cognition – ideas – as its object of work. Co-operation is based on communication and uses the products of communication – meanings – as object of work. Information is a work process, in which cognitive work creates ideas, communicative work creates meanings and co-operative work co-creates information products that have shared and co-created meaning. Information is a dialectical process of human work, in which cognition, communication and cooperation are dialectically connected. Each of these three processes forms a work process that has its own subject-object-dialectic in itself.

Using the Hegel-Marxist triangle model of the work process, one can argue that the development that Marx points out on behalf of the notion of the general intellect can be formalised as follows: S-O>SO...S-SO>SSO...S-SSO>SSSO and so forth. The object position of a dialectical work triangle starts with the result, the subject-object of a previous triangle and so on. The advantage of this kind of thinking is that the reference to an object and ultimately nature never gets completely lost in the theory. Hence a dualism between subject and object, e.g. communication and work is prevented. Dialectical thinking is capable of providing an integrative theory of human activity.




FIGURE 2.3 *The information process as work process*

An example: A person likes reading books about gardening and builds up a sophisticated knowledge of how to create and maintain a good-looking garden by reading more and more books and applying this knowledge in his/her garden. The created knowledge is a use-value in the sense that it helps him/her organise her/his own garden in a nice-looking manner. S/he meets another person, who has comparable knowledge. They start exchanging ideas on gardening. In this communication process, the shared knowledge of one person forms an object that is interpreted by the other person so that meaning, i.e. an interpretation of parts of the world, is formed. The process also works vice-versa. As a result, meanings are created as use-values on both sides; each person understands something about the other. After continuous conversations and mutual learning, the two hobby gardeners decide to write a book about gardening. They develop new ideas by discussing and bring their experiences together, whereby synergies, new experiences and new gardening methods emerge. In the book, they describe these new methods that they have tried in practice in a jointly run garden. The representations of the joint experiences and of the co-created methods in the form of a book are a use-value not just for the two, but for others too.

Work requires information processes and information creation is itself a work process. This model allows a non-dualistic solution to the question of how work and information/interaction are connected. It avoids separations between nature/culture, work/interaction, base/superstructure, but rather argues that information has its own economy – it is work that creates specific use-values. These use-values are individual in character only at the level of cognition – the human thinks and develops new ideas –, whereas they have a direct social character at the level of communication and co-operation. But humans do not exist as monads, the objects of cognitive work stem to a large degree from society itself. To interpret the information creation process as work is not philosophical idealism because idealism sees spirit as independently existing entity that is not connected to human labour. Ideas, meanings and co-created information products are objects of labour that reflect society in complex ways.

Every work process requires cognition, communication and cooperation as tools of production. Therefore the physical production of goods in manufacturing as well as agricultural work and mining are never separate from information processes. This aspect has been stressed in many Marxist analysis of the connection of communication and work. In these production forms, information is not a product, but a means of production. Work requires information. The other way round, information is also work: there is an informational mode of production that has grown in size in the 20th century (in terms of the population active in it and share of the overall created value in the economy):

it focuses on the production of informational goods and services. It is this kind of production that is the main focus of our attention in this paper. Work requires information and communication. But at the same time, it is important to give attention to information and communication as forms of work.

The production of information is work. But society and the economy cannot be reduced to information, language and communication. Pan-informational concepts of society that reduce all human existence to information are just like approaches that ignore information and culture reductionist. Work is always an economic process that produces physical and/or informational results. Information is grounded in work and the economy, but at the same time has emergent qualities in that it communicates meanings in society, which makes it a specifically cultural resource.

### **Ideological Labour and Critical Work**

Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1977) questions the assumption that language is always a common good that cannot be a private property. He introduces in this context the notion of linguistic private property, by which he means that a ruling class possesses “control over the emission and circulation of the verbal and non-verbal messages which are constitutive of a given community” (Rossi-Landi 1977, 191). Rossi-Landi (1983, 170f) argues that the ruling class has linguistic private property over a) codes, modalities of codification, b) channels used for the circulation of messages, c) modalities of decoding and interpretation. “The ruling class increases the redundancy of the messages which confirm its own position and attacks with noise, or if necessary with disturbance, the codification and circulation of messages which could instead invalidate it” (Rossi-Landi 1983, 171). Communications are means for making information public and giving humans a voice that is heard by others and has the potential to influence what is happening in society. Communication power means the capacity to communicate information in society in a public manner so that it is recognised by others and has transformative effects on society. Communications can have different ownership forms.

A critical concept of ideology requires a normative distinction between true and false beliefs and practices. A critical concept of ideology means thoughts, practices, ideas, words, concepts, phrases, sentences, texts, belief systems, meanings, representations, artefacts, institutions, systems or combinations thereof that represent and justify one group's or individual's domination or exploitation of other groups or individuals. Domination means in this context that there is a system that enables one human side to gain advantages at the

expense of others and to sustain this condition. It is a routinised and institutionalised form of asymmetric power, in which one side has the opportunity to shape and control societal structures (such as the production and control of wealth, political decision-making, public discussions, ideas, norms, rules, values), whereas others do not have these opportunities and are facing disadvantages or exclusion from the opportunities of others. Exploitation is a specific form of domination, in which an exploiting class derives wealth advantages at the expense of an exploited class by controlling economic resources and means of coercion in such a way that the exploited class is forced to produce new use-values that the exploiting class controls. Ideology presupposes “societal structures, in which different groups and conflicting interests act and strive to impose their interest onto the total of society as its general interest. To put it shortly: The emergence and diffusion of ideologies appears as the general characteristic of class societies” (Lukács 1986, 405, translation from German).

Terry Eagleton (1991) has noted six core understandings of the concept of ideology:

1. The general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life.
2. Ideas coherently symbolize the conditions and life-experiences of a specific group or class.
3. The promotion and legitimatization of the interests of a group or class in the face of opposing interests.
4. The promotion and legitimatization of the interests of a dominant social group in order to unify a social formation.
5. Ideas and beliefs that help to legitimate the interests of a ruling group/class by distortion and dissimulation.
6. False and deceptive beliefs arising from the material structure of society as a whole.

We can think about Eagleton’s (1991) six concepts of ideology as variously interlinked levels of ideology. The differentiation between levels allows us also to see that false consciousness is not a necessary element of ideology; it may be just one outcome of ideological strategies, but can also be resisted (although there is no automatism of resistance and the means for producing hegemonic ideology and counter-hegemony are unequally distributed). Ideology is not necessarily a state of consciousness of dominated groups. It can be, but it is more a process, in which dominant groups communicate dominant ideas, to which others react in certain ways or do not react. Dominant ideas impact the culture of the dominant itself (e.g. neoliberal work norms – the new spirit of

networked capitalism – that impact not only what is expected of the behaviour of workers, but also managers).

Ideology is a semiotic level of domination and exploitation – it practices the production and spread of information and meanings in the form of ideas, belief systems, artefacts, systems and institutions so that domination and exploitation are justified or naturalised. Ideology is a special form of individual, social and societal semiosis that is embedded into structures of domination and aims at justifying, naturalising, upholding, defending and containing actual or potential resistance against specific forms of domination. It aims at making a broader public believe that society or a social system in its dominative or exploitative status should remain unchanged and is good, fair, free, or just the way it is. This goal is associated with the task of spreading information that tries to convince subordinated individuals and groups not to work for transformations or to support forces and ideas that question the status quo.

If language use and communication are work processes, then a specific subset of language use and communication is ideological in character and a specific other subset is critical in character. Ideologies are the outcome of ideological work, critical knowledge the outcome of critical cultural work.

Ideologies have specific structures. Teun van Dijk (1998, Chapter 5; 2011, 386, 395f) classifies the structure of ideologies the following way:

- Membership, identity: Who are we? Where are we from? What do we look like? Who can become a member of our group?
- Activities: What do we do? What is expected of us? Why are we here?
- Goals: Why do we do this? What do we want to realise?
- Values/norms: What are our main values? How do we evaluate ourselves and others? What should (not) be done?
- Position and group-relations: What is our social position? Who are our enemies, our opponents? Who are like us, and who are different?
- Resources: What are the essential social resources that our group has or needs to have?

This means that the production, reproduction and diffusion of an ideology is work that defines the membership, identity, activities, goals, values and norms, positions and resources of a dominant or exploitative group in relationship to a dominated or exploited group in such a way that the power of the first is with specific definition strategies that create particular meanings legitimatised, naturalised and presented as unproblematic. The structure of an ideology can be explained as a dialectical information process: it defines individual dimensions of a group, system or human being, the being-in-itself of the ideology:

identity, membership, activities, norms, values, goals, controlled resources. Then it relates this being-in-itself in a specific manner to a dominated group's being-in-itself (its identity, membership, activities, norms, values, goals, resources) and defines this relationship (being-for-another) in such a way that the dominant group's being-in-itself is justified and the dominated group's being-in-itself presented as inferior, but an inferiority that is necessary and justified. Ideology suggests that this relationship of two phenomena or groups should be resolved in a specific manner by taking specific measures that change reality in specific ways so that the asymmetric power relation between dominant group and the dominated group is maintained. This fusion and resolution is then an ideological being-in-and-for-itself. So ideology defines individual existences, relates them and suggests how this relationship should be shaped and changed. So a racist ideology describes a) a national group and a group of immigrants, b) a specific relationship between them by claiming e.g. that immigrants are criminals, do not work, speak different languages, have different customs etc and thereby negatively impact the lives of the national group, and suggests c) specific measures, such as the deportation of immigrants. Ideological work conducts the definition of ideological identities (ideological being-in-itself), relations (ideological being-for-another) and measures (ideological being-in-and-for-itself), the diffusion of these definitions into society, the crystallisation of these ideologies in groups, institutions, structures and orders and the maintenance and reproduction of ideology on all of these levels.

Ideological work employs different ways of how in the second step of the definition process the relation between the dominant group and the dominated group is described. Teun van Dijk (2011, 397f; 1998, 267) has logically formalised possible arguments in the Ideological Square Model. The model contains logical arguments of how ideologies justify dominative relationships. In reality, a concrete ideology often combines several of these logical possibilities that entail positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. So ideology defines in-groups and out-groups and uses various ideological strategies:

- To express/emphasise information that is positive about Us,
- To express/emphasise information that is negative about Them,
- To suppress/de-emphasise information that is positive about Them,
- To suppress/de-emphasise information that is negative about Us.

Klaus Holzkamp (1985, 364, translation from German to English) stresses that ideology works by an "identification of general interests and partial interests"

for the “perpetuation of the existing relations.” Dominated and dominating individuals always have the possibility and therefore freedom to break through existing ideologies in order to think and act differently. This does however not automatically happen and in dominative relationships many “individuals by managing their everyday life in which they realise conditioned possibilities of action, relations and thought, reproduce ‘with their own existence simultaneously bourgeois class relations’ as unquestioned precondition” (Holzkamp 1985, 364, translation from German to English). In ideologies, “possibilities for action and thought that are determined by heteronomous constraints’ appear as the ‘only ‘thinkable’ possibilities’ for the creation of the conditions required to secure and unfold existence in ‘freedom and equality’” (Holzkamp 1985, 365, translation from German to English). Holzkamp stresses that dominated groups’ and individuals’ reproduction of ideologies is grounded in existential fears and risks. Available ideologies, worldviews and power constellations condition individuals’ specific worldviews and actions and the actuality of realising alternative thoughts and actions that are always possible. If one thinks through Holzkamp’s argument then it becomes evident that the major fear that keeps people who are dominated from resisting or trying to organise resistance or joining resistance movement is the fear of death and related to it the fear of violence and torture and the experience of these negative realities not just for oneself, but for one’s friends and family. Humans do not by nature subject themselves voluntarily to domination, rather their existential fears and needs for security, harmony, recognition, community is under conditions of domination often channelled into acceptance of one’s own domination and exercise of domination against weaker groups and individuals (Holzkamp-Osterkamp 1983).

Many critical theories and analyses of discourse and ideologies in an idealistic manner focus on the level of texts and structures of ideologies and ignore the work or producing and reproducing ideologies. One needs to shed light on how ideologies operate and what their consequences are just like one needs to analyse who produces ideologies, under which circumstances, and with which motivations, goals and intentions. Ideology critique requires analysis of ideology structures and the work of ideology production just like the analysis of work requires an analysis of the structures and conditions of work, including the ideologies that shape workplaces and work cultures.

Table 2.2 gives an overview of various cultural workers in various dimensions of society. They all produce knowledge that is either ideological or critical. In heteronomous/class societies, ideological workers are almost found with certainty. They dominate specific fields and the resources within these fields. Critical workers produce critical knowledge that challenges ideologies.

TABLE 2.2 *Workers, ideologies and worldviews in various fields of society*

Realm of society	Ideological work	Critical work
Economy	Management gurus, consultants, managers: capitalist and liberal ideologies	Activists, unions, social movements, consumer protection groups, critical intellectuals: socialist worldviews critical of capitalism
Politics: government, parliament	Dominant or oppositional parties and politicians: political ideologies of inequality, domination and repression/violence	Critical parties, politicians, intellectuals: political worldviews of equality, participation and peace
Politics: civil society	Repressive social movements, NGOs and activists: political ideologies of inequality, domination and repression/violence	Emancipatory social movements, NGOs and activists: worldviews of equality, participation and peace
International relations	Nationalists: nationalist ideology	Anti-nationalists: global unity in diversity
News media	Uncritical journalists: one-dimensional, biased reports	Critical journalists: critical, engaging reports
Entertainment	Actors, entertainers, directors, artists: tabloidised, one-dimensional culture	Actors, entertainers, directors, artists: engaging, dialectical culture
Personal and gender relations	Hellbenders: hate, sexism	Altruists: love, care, solidarity
Belief systems, ethics, philosophy and religion	Demagogues: Conservatism	Public intellectuals: Progressivism
Science and education	Administrative scholars and teachers: administrative knowledge	Critical scholars and teachers: critical knowledge
Intercultural relations	Racists, divisionists: racism	Universalists: intercultural understanding

In heteronomous/class societies such work is always a potential, but not necessarily and not automatically an actuality because critique requires resources that are not so easy to mobilise and often controlled by those ruling the societal field(s).

The hegemony of ideologies and ideological workers can be challenged by counter-hegemonic work. Gramsci (1988, 58) says in this context that making a revolution needs “intense labour of criticism.” In such cases, there is the possibility for cultural class struggles, in which critical cultural workers oppose and struggle against ideological workers. In such cases, critical workers – those producing critiques as discursive knowledge in semiotic processes – create and diffuse socialism, equality and participation, unity in diversity, dialectic, love, care, Progressivism, critical knowledge, or understanding in order to challenge the ideologies created, diffused and reproduced by ideological workers, such as liberalism, inequality and domination, nationalism, one-dimensionality, hate, sexism, conservatism, administrative knowledge and racism. Cultural struggles’ emergence and outcomes are never determined, but highly uncertain. Ideological work and critical work are highly fluid, dynamic and entangled. Whereas one article in a newspaper may be ideological, another may be critical. But in general there is a tendency of institutional clustering so that ideologies and critique become crystallised in institutions that continuously create, diffuse and reproduce certain ideologies or critiques. Such institutions have internal contradictions (between dominant factions and their ideologies, between dominant and subordinate groups and their discourses) and external ones (between different institutions, institutions and other institutions, systems and groups in society etc.).

Subordinated groups and individuals do not necessarily develop critical or false consciousness. Ideology is a process with uncertain outcomes. Given the power of dominant groups and the relative powerlessness of dominated groups, the average likelihood of critical consciousness tends to be lower than that of ideological consciousness, unless dominated groups and individuals empower themselves and learn to see through ideologies, to question them and to struggle against them. Dominant classes and groups always try to impose their ideologies on subordinated people. The dominated answer to this ideological communication process is in a positive (affirmation, hegemony), negative (critique, counter-hegemony) or mixed way. As ideologists speak to individuals through ideology, those addressed tend to react and to communicate back in specific ways that are not determined.

The existence of ideologies created and diffused by ideological workers on behalf of a dominant group is independent of the question how people react to ideologies. There are different possibilities, either that they are conscious

or unconscious that an ideology is an ideology or a mixed form, either that they follow, partly follow, question or resist ideologies. In the first edition of *Capital* (1867), Volume 1, Marx discussed the fetishism of commodities by saying that ideology is based on the logic ‘they do not know it, but they do it’. Slavoj Žižek (1989, 25) suggests based on Peter Sloterdijk that today the cynical subject bases its action on the logic “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.” Žižek argues that humans partly know about the falseness of ideology, but follow it because they derive a surplus of enjoyment from it. Ideology is always false in that it contains dominant ideas aimed at justifying dominative reality. How human subjects react to ideology has to do with their subjectivity, i.e. their knowing and their doing in relation to ideology. Table 2.3 shows 16 logic combinations of how humans can react to ideology. The way Žižek describes ideology is just one of 16 possibilities of how humans can react to ideologies. They partly or entirely reproduce ideologies in their actions in the eight possibilities of the first two columns. They do not follow or struggle against ideologies in the eight possibilities displayed in the third and fourth column. The 16 logical possibilities have based on specific power structures different likelihoods. It is for example quite unlikely that

TABLE 2.3 *A typology of subjective reactions to ideology*

Action → Knowledge	Following an ideology	Following parts of an ideology	Not following an ideology	Resisting an ideology
Unconscious of an ideology	They do not know it, but they do it.	They do not know it, but they partly do it.	They do not know it and they do not do it.	They do not know it and they resist it.
Conscious of an ideology	They know it, but still, they are doing it.	They know it and they partly do it	They know it and they do not do it.	They know it and they resist it.
Partly conscious of an ideology	They partly know it, but still, they are doing it.	They partly know it and they partly do it.	They partly know it and they do not do it.	They partly know it and they resist it.
Critically conscious of an ideology	They oppose it and they do it.	They oppose it and they partly do (not) do it.	They oppose it and they do not do it.	They oppose it and they resist it.

people resist an ideology by accident, although they are unconscious of it, whereas it is much more likely that they are consciously aware and opposed to it when resisting it.

The production of ideologies and critiques requires workers who create the specific ideational content. But making ideologies and critiques that challenge them work is not just a knowledge production process, but requires multiple associated work processes within institutions and social systems. Take for example a school: there are teachers and pupils who engage in learning, which manifests, creates, reproduces and challenges critiques and ideologies to specific degrees. But work processes that are associated and necessary for enabling learning in schools are cleaners' maintenance of the school building; policy makers', consultants' and experts' design of the curriculum, food personnel's preparation of food in the cafeteria, etc. In order to understand the production of ideologies and critiques one therefore needs to consider the broader institutional foundations and contexts. This means that for analysing work that creates ideologies and critiques one should avoid cultural idealism and take, as suggested by Raymond Williams, a cultural materialist position that sees the embeddedness of culture, ideology and knowledge in different forms of work (information work, service work, physical work, etc).

### Conclusion

I have argued that Marxist theory has too often treated the relationship of work on the one hand and culture, communication, language and ideology on the other hand in a dualistic manner. Based on Raymond Williams and Ferruccio Rossi-Landi's works, I have argued for a cultural-materialist approach that sees culture as work that produces symbols and meaning as specific use-values and communication as work process that circulates symbols and meanings in society. Ideology can based on these theoretical assumptions be considered as a form of labour conducted by ideological workers that aims at legitimating the interests of dominant groups and classes. Critical work in contrast challenges ideological work, but is at the same time in capitalism often confronted with an unequal distribution of resources that enable critical work.

A theory of culture, communication and ideology is a dialectical tool of theorising, understanding and helping to inspire struggles against capitalism. It stands in solidarity with those who work towards overcoming class societies along with all ideological labour that legitimate these structures.

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